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period.16  Written consent of all interested owners is
required for this method.17
The regulations authorize an increase or decrease in
allotment, quota or base by as much as 10 percent if the
owners agree in writing and the county committee
determines that the method used did not produce an
equitable division.18
________________________________________________
FOOTNOTES
1 See generally 11 Harl, Agricultural Law ch. 91 (1993); Harl,
Agricultural Law Manual  § 10.03 (1993).
2 7 U.S.C. § 1379 (1988).
3 7 C.F.R. § 719.8 (1993).
4 7 U.S.C. § 1379(a) (1988).
5 Id.
6 7 C.F.R. § 719.8(a) (1993).
7 7 C.F.R. § 719.8(a)(1) (1993).
8 7 C.F.R. § 719.8(a)(2) (1993).
9 7 C.F.R. § 719.8(c) (1993). See sample request form below.
Note that enforcement of the division of a quota between the
parties depends on state law. See KcKim v. Kauffman, 424
S.E.2d 11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (failure of farm seller to sign
transfer of peanut quota to buyer was breach of contract; court
had jurisdiction because A.S.C.S. refusal to transfer quota
based solely on breach of contract between buyer and seller).
10 Id., § 719.8(c)(4)(i). A sample memorandum of understanding
is provided below.
11 Id., § 719.8(c)(4)(iii).
12 Id., § 719.8(c)(4) (iv).
13 Id., § 719.8(c)(5).
14 Id., § 719.8(d).
15 7 C.F.R. § 719.8(f).
16 Id., § 719.8(g).
17 Id., § 719.8(g)(2).
18 Id., § 719.8(h).
____________________________________________________________________
Memorandum of Understanding
On this ______ day of _______ 19__, the undersigned, ____________ Seller
and__________ Buyer, do hereby agree as follows:
1. The Buyer has agreed to purchase certain real property previously owned
by Seller, in ________ Township, ____________ County, __________, and more
specifically described as ______________________________________, containing
80 acres more or less, said purchase having been previously agreed to in a certain
contract between Seller and Buyer dated _________________.
2. The Seller represents that Seller had owned the subject real property for
more than three years.
3. The Seller and Buyer acknowledge that the subject real property has been
farmed as part of a larger farming operation by Seller for many years.
4. The Seller represents that the subject real property and other real property
owned and operated by Seller has been entered voluntarily into certain price and
income support programs administered by the United States Department of
Agriculture and that, as a result of such voluntary participation, said real property has
been awarded an allotment or quota denominated as a "base" for purposes of
_________ production.
5. The Seller and the Buyer acknowledge that a separate conveyance of the
subject tract of ___ acres more or less requires a division of the base acreage for corn
and oats as between the subject tract and other real property owned by Seller.
6. The Seller and the Buyer agree that the method of division of crop base
known and referred to as the "Designation By Landowner" method provides an
acceptable division of the base acreage for the crops involved.
7. The Seller and the Buyer agree that the crop history for the five year period
of 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 represents a logical, fair and equitable guide for
division of base acreages for the crops in question and reflects fairly decisions by the
Seller during that time period as to the most appropriate land use for the subject tract
and other real property then owned by Seller. [This paragraph is not required]
8. The Seller and the Buyer further agree that the approach hereinbefore
outlined for the division of acreage bases for _____ produces an acreage base of ____
acres of _____ base for the ____ acre tract in question and ____ acres of
__________; and that such figures be recommended to the Agricultural Stabilization
and Conservation Committee for _____________ County, _______,  for approval.
Signed at ___________________, _________, on the date first above written.
__________________               ____________________
BUYER SELLER
Letter to ASCS County Committee
______________, 19__
ASCS Committee
__________ County
_________________
_________________
Dear Committee Members:
Enclosed herewith please find a Memorandum of Understanding by and between
__       , Seller, and _________, Buyer, pertaining to the conveyance under contract
dated __________, of the tract of land described as                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ____              .
As required by 2-CM Handbook, the Buyers do hereby identify the following tracts
as believed to be comparable to the above described tract:
Farm No.Farmland Cropland Corn Yield OatsYield
325 86 81.3 69.3 90 0 0
377 200 177.1 90.5 113 7.4 5.53
305 40 38.8 18.3 107 0 0
The above identified comparable tracts are either located adjacent to the subject tract
(which is the case with farms no. 325 and 2377) or within one-quarter mile (as in the
case of farm no. 305).  Moreover, the soil type, topography, fertility level and past
management practices are comparable for the subject tract and the comparable tracts.
As further required by 2-CM Handbook, the Buyers do hereby identify the following
tracts as believed to be comparable to the real property retained by Seller:
Farm No.Farmland Cropland Corn Yield OatsYield
2194 530 421.9 23.7 88 5.1 42
366 120 54.7 10.7 94 0 0
2265 380 289.4 59.2 95 19.2 44
The tracts identified as comparable represent the same general soil class and are
similar in topography and fertility level to the real property retained by Seller.
A request is hereby made for approval by the County Committee of the crop acreage
bases identified and explained in the enclosed Memorandum of Understanding.
Please advise if you have questions on the above.
Sincerely,
Buyer
enc
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[4].
ANNUITY. The debtor was a beneficiary of an annuity
purchased by an insurance company in satisfaction of a
personal injury judgment against the insurance company.
The debtor claimed the annuity as exempt under Fla. Stat. §
222.14.  A creditor objected to the exemption, arguing that
the exemption should not be allowed for annuity payments
of court judgments. In a certified question from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, the Florida Supreme
Court held that the annuity exemption applied to all
annuities, including annuities used to satisfy court
judgments. The exemption was allowed. In re McCollam,
986 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1993).
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The debtor
claimed payments from a structured wrongful death
settlement as exempt under Va. Code § 34-28.1. The court
held that the statute applied only to the proceeds of awards
and settlements from personal injury actions, which did not
include wrongful death actions. In re Cassell, 151 B.R. 78
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993).
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The debtor was the beneficiary of an annuity contract
purchased by an insurance company in settlement of a
personal injury action brought by the debtor. The debtor
continued to suffer medical and psychiatric disability from
the injuries and the court found that the annuity proceeds
were almost entirely needed to pay the medical costs of the
injuries and that the debtor had no ability for employment.
The court held that the debtor was entitled to claim the
entire monthly annuity payments as exempt because the
payments qualified for the personal injury award exemption
and the exemption for compensation for loss of future
earnings. In re Chaney, 151 B.R. 147 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1993).
    CHAPTER 12   
CONVERSION-ALM § 13.03[8][d].* The debtors had
filed a Chapter 12 case and had obtained confirmation of a
plan which provided that most of the estate property
revested with the debtors. The case was converted to
Chapter 7 during the pendency of the plan. On the date of
conversion, the debtors had money in a bank account and
several accounts receivable from the sale of crops. The
debtors made various payments from the bank account,
including amounts deposited from the accounts receivables
after the conversion. The debtors argued that the bank
account and accounts receivable were not estate property
because the Chapter 12 plan revested the property with the
debtors. The court held that the provisions of a Chapter 12
plan remain defeasable until the debtors complete the plan
and receive a discharge and that the conversion of the
Chapter 12 case to Chapter 7 before discharge revests all
the debtor’s property to the estate.  The court held that the
amounts in the bank account and accounts receivables were
estate property and ordered return of all payments.  In re
White, 151 B.R. 274 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1993).
ESTATE PROPERTY-ALM § 13.03[8][c]. The
debtors’ three-year Chapter 12 plan provided for payment to
creditors of disposable income for the 1988, 1989 and 1990
crop years. In 1990, the debtors received approval of the
amount of disposable income for 1988 and completed
payments for that year.  In 1991, after completion of the
1990 crop year but before approval of the 1989 and 1990
disposable income payments, the debtors inherited property
from a parent. The court then entered an order approving
the 1989 and 1990 disposable income payments and
discharging the debtors but a creditor objected, arguing that
the inheritance was estate property and should have been
included in the disposable income. The court held that the
inheritance was property of the estate but that the
inheritance was not includible in disposable income because
it was received after the final plan year. The court
disregarded the fact that a final determination of disposable
income and discharge had not been made when the
inheritance accrued, stating that the delay was not caused by
the debtors and but for the delay, the inheritance would
have occurred after the closing of the case. In re Hart, 151
B.R. 84 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[8][c]. The debtor’s Chapter 12
plan provided for payment to unsecured creditors of an
amount equal to the amount the creditors would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation. The trustee, however, deducted from
the debtor’s payments on this amount, the trustee fees and
post-confirmation administrative expenses, including
attorney’s fees. The trustee argued that the trustee fees and
administrative expenses were unsecured claims required to
be paid first out of the liquidation payment amount. The
court held that the payment of trustee fees and post-
confirmation administrative expenses was the debtor’s
liability and that the liquidation amount in full was to be
paid to the unsecured creditors. In re Winter, 151 B.R. 278
(Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1993).
    CHAPTER 13   
PLAN-ALM § 13.03[3]. A creditor sought prepetition
foreclosure on a mortgage on the debtors’ residence. The
debtors’ Chapter 13 plan provided for payment of less than
the remaining amount owed with a 10 percent interest rate.
The court held that the debtors were not prohibited from
modifying the mortgaged debt on their residence. However,
the court also held that because (1) the debt was short term
and had been accelerated by the creditor and (2) the
residence was worth much more than the remaining debt,
the debtors were required to pay the full balance of the loan
plus costs and attorney’s fees at the contract rate of interest.
In re Aguirre, 150 B.R. 922 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1993).
The debtor’s Chapter 13 plan provided for bifurcation of
a mortgage against the debtor’s residence into secured and
unsecured claims and the creditors objected. The court held
that a Chapter 13 plan could bifurcate a mortgage against a
debtor’s residence into secured and unsecured claims, avoid
the unsecured claims and provide for payment of the
secured portion as provided by the original loan agreement
terms. However, the plan must also provide for payment of
any arrears over a reasonable time not longer than the plan
period and provide for payment of the unsecured claim in
an amount not less than the creditor would receive in a
Chapter 7 liquidation. In re Richards, 151 B.R. 8 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
CAPITAL EXPENSES . A Chapter 11 debtor
corporation was allowed to deduct currently professional
fees and expenses relating to operating the business during
the bankruptcy proceeding where the corporation provided
sufficient evidence of the segregation of the expenses
between the operation of the business and the
reorganization in bankruptcy.  In re Placid Oil Co., 93-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50, 234 (5th Cir. 1993), rev’g, 92-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,049 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
CLAIMS. The IRS had not received a notice of the
debtor’s bankruptcy case until eight months after the bar
date for claims; however, the IRS failed to file a claim until
two years after receiving the notice. The IRS claim involved
a priority claim for unpaid taxes for which the debtor had
not filed a tax return. The court held that the IRS claim
would be allowed as a priority claim because no
distributions from the estate had been made by the trustee
and the lower courts had not found any bad faith or
unreasonable delay by the IRS. In re Century Boat Co.,
986 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1993).
The debtor did not list the IRS as a creditor until after
the bar date for claims. The IRS then filed for permission to
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file a late claim. The court held that because the IRS did not
receive notice of the bankruptcy until after the bar date, the
untimely claim would be allowed. In re Vaughn, 151 B.R.
87 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993).
The IRS had filed a timely claim for tax penalties
against the debtors as responsible persons in a corporation
which failed to withhold and pay employment taxes. After
the bar date for claims, the IRS filed additional claims for
the same penalties as to the same corporation but for
different time periods and as to another corporation in
which the debtors were responsible persons. The court held
that the new claims were sufficiently linked to the timely
claims to be amendments to the timely claims.  The
amendments were allowed because the delay in filing the
claims was caused, in part, by the debtors’ failure to file tax
returns or otherwise assist the IRS in determining the
liability, even though the debtors knew the corporations
owed employment taxes. In re Barton, 151 B.R. 110
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1993).
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6]. The debtors made
several pre-petition gift transfers of property for which no
federal gift tax return was filed or gift tax paid. The debtors
listed the claims as disputed on their schedules but the IRS
filed no claim for the gift taxes in the case. The debtors’
confirmed plan made no provision for payment of the gift
taxes and the plan was consummated. The debtors filed an
objection to the IRS post-confirmation assessment of the
gift taxes as barred by the confirmation of the plan. The
court held that the confirmation order had no effect on the
dischargeability of the gift taxes which were not
dischargeable under Section 523(a)(1) because no return
was filed. In re Grynberg, 986 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1993),
aff’g, 142 B.R. 415 (D. Colo. 1991).
The IRS filed claims for several years of taxes due more
than three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition.
The debtor had filed returns for the taxes but made no
payments except when forced by repeated IRS levies. The
court held that the taxes were nondischargeable because the
debtor’s history of nonpayment except when forced by the
levies and the debtor’s attempts to foil the IRS levy
attempts demonstrated willful attempt to evade or defeat
payment of the taxes. In re Lewis, 151 B.R. 140 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. 1992).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. After the debtors had
received a discharge of their 1982 taxes in their Chapter 7
case and the case had been closed, the IRS filed a Notice to
Levy against the debtor’s wages and attempted to apply
later tax refunds against the 1982 taxes. The debtor sued for
sanctions for violation of the discharge order by the IRS.
The IRS argued that because it had not filed a claim in the
Chapter 7 case, under U.S. v. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct.
1011 (1992), it had not waived sovereign immunity against
the debtor’s suit. The court held that the debtor’s were
entitled to sanctions, including costs and attorney’s fees,
because Nordic Village did not prohibit actions for
sanctions against the IRS but only prohibited actions for
money judgments. In re Daniels, 150 B.R. 985 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1992).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
COMMODITY FUTURES. The CCC has announced
the establishment of an options pilot program (OPP) to
allow participants in the corn and soybean acreage
reduction program to purchase put options contract for 1993
on the Chicago Board of Trade. The pilot program is
restricted to three counties in each of Iowa, Illinois and
Indiana. 58 Fed. Reg. 21876 (April 23, 1993). Note: For a
warning about the income tax consequences of participating
in the OPP, see p. 32 supra.
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMOD-
ITIES ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].  A produce seller sold
produce to the debtor under a written agreement that
payment was due within 30 days after invoice.  However,
because the Bankruptcy Court found that the parties in
practice ignored the payment term provision, the court held
that the produce seller had failed to comply with the PACA
trust fund requirements. On appeal, the District Court held
that the payment terms in the written agreement controlled
and that the course of dealing between the parties did not
affect the produce seller’s eligibility for the PACA trust
fund. The produce seller later purchased produce stalls from
the buyer in partial satisfaction of past due accounts and
leased the stalls back to the buyer, giving the buyer an
option to repurchase some of the stalls if the past due
amounts were paid.  The court held that this arrangement
gave the seller equity securing the produce sold after the
transfer and the seller did not have rights in the PACA trust
funds after the transfer.  In re Lombardo Fruit & Produce
Co., 150 B.R. 941 (E.D. Mo. 1993), aff’g in part and rev’g
in part, 107 B.R. 952 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1989).
The plaintiff was a produce supplier who sold produce
to a company with six grocery stores. The company sold the
stores to the defendant and the plaintiff sought recovery
from the PACA trust for unpaid for produce. The parties
agreed that the PACA trust contained at least the value of
the produce and the sales of produce on the last day of the
previous owner’s day of business. The issue remained as to
who had the burden of proving how much of the company’s
other inventory was purchased with PACA trust funds and,
therefore, remained subject to the PACA trust. The court
held that the burden was on the defendant. Sanzone-
Palmisano Co. v. M. Seaman Enter., 986 F.2d 1010 (6th
Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DEDUCTIONS-ALM § 5.04. At the death of the
decedent’s predeceased spouse, the decedent’s two stepsons
challenged the spouse’s will leaving everything to the
decedent. The decedent and the stepsons reached an
agreement under which the decedent was to include in the
decedent’s will a bequest of 40 percent of the estate to the
stepsons. After the decedent’s death, the stepsons filed a
claim against the estate under the agreement for the 40
percent share. The decedent’s executrix agreed to pay the
stepsons their 40 percent and claimed the payment as a
deduction against the taxable estate. The court held that the
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payment was not deductible because the only consideration
for the payment was the donative intent of the spouse’s.
Est. of Huntington v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. No. 19 (1993).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* The taxpayer established four identical trusts for
four grandchildren, with trust corpus exceeding the GSTT
exemption amount. During the life of the taxpayer, the
trusts were to accumulate all income and make no
distributions. At the death of the taxpayer, the trustee could
distribute to each beneficiary so much of the trust income as
was necessary for the beneficiary’s support, education,
health and maintenance. One-third of each trust corpus was
to be distributed when each beneficiary reached age 30,
with the remainder distributed when the beneficiary reached
age 35. If the beneficiary died before full distribution of the
trust corpus, the trust property passed in the following
order: (1) to the lineal descendants of the beneficiary, (2) to
the lineal descendants of the beneficiary’s parent, (3) as
appointed by will by the beneficiary, and (4) to a charity.
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s transfers of property to
the trusts were direct skips. During the taxpayer’s life, the
taxpayer either will serve as trustee or have the power to
change the trustee. The IRS ruled that the trust property
would not be included in the taxpayer’s estate because no
property was to be distributed during the taxpayer’s life;
therefore, the taxpayer had no power to alter the
beneficiaries’ rights in the trusts. Ltr. Rul. 9314033, Jan. 8,
1993.
GIFT-ALM § 6.01 . The taxpayer and the other equal
shareholder entered into a cross-purchase shareholder
agreement which established the total value of the stock.
The agreement also provided for the required purchase by
the taxpayer’s son of the stock of the first shareholder to
die, using the proceeds of life insurance on the decedent
shareholder. The agreement also provided for adjustment of
the value of the stock by a majority vote of the
shareholders.  The other shareholder died by suicide,
resulting only in life insurance proceeds equal to the amount
of premiums paid. Under the agreement, if the taxpayer’s
son failed to purchase all of the decedent’s stock, the
corporation was required to purchase the stock at the
established price. When the son failed to purchase more
than 2.59 shares of stock, the taxpayer had the corporation
redeem the decedent’s shares and transferred 11.41 of the
decedent’s shares to the son plus 14 shares owned by the
taxpayer. Later, the taxpayer transferred 111 shares to the
son. The IRS ruled that the transfers of the stock to the son
were taxable gifts: (1) the transfer of the decedent's 11.41
shares was a gift because it represented the taxpayer's
relinquishment of a right to have the corporation purchase
the shares which would have increased the taxpayer’s share
in the corporation; (2) the transfers of the 14 and 111 shares
were taxable gifts valued at the fair market value of the
stock because, as majority shareholder, the taxpayer had the
power to increase the value of the stock for redemption and
shareholder purchase purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9315005, Dec. 31,
1992.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02. At the time of death
the decedent was a co-trustee and beneficiary of a trust
established by the decedent's parent.  A bank was the other
co-trustee.  The trustees had the power to distribute trust
corpus to any beneficiary for the continued comfort,
support, maintenance or education of the beneficiary.  The
decedent became mentally incompetent within a year before
and until death.  The court held that the decedent did not
have a general power of appointment over the trust corpus
because the distribution of trust corpus was subject to an
ascertainable standard.  Est. of Vissering v. Comm'r, 93-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,133 (10th Cir. 1993), rev’g and
rem’g,  96 T.C. 749 (1991).
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT-ALM §
6.02[1]. The decedent had established a revocable trust
funded with Series E and H bonds. Both sets of bonds had
unreported increases in value. The trust provided that upon
the decedent’s death, the trustee was to distribute a fixed
sum to a charity. The trustee proposed to distribute the
bonds in satisfaction of the pecuniary amount for the
charity. The IRS ruled that the transfer of the bonds would
constitute a disposition causing the unreported increase in
value to be reported as trust income. Ltr. Rul. 9315016,
Jan. 15, 1993.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].  The decedent and spouse had created a
trust for themselves with the remainder to pass to the
surviving trustor and then to the couple’s children and
grandchildren. The decedent’s estate consisted primarily of
an interest in a closely-held business and the estate elected
to pay the estate tax in installments. During the
administration of the estate, the surviving spouse died and
the trust assets passed to the children and grandchildren.
The IRS ruled that the decedent’s estate, under I.R.C. §
6166, was not allowed to pay any generation skipping
transfer tax by installments but that under I.R.C. §
6161(a)(2), the Commissioner had the authority to grant the
estate up to 10 years to pay the GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9314050,
Jan. 13, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3]. The
decedent’s will provided that estate taxes were to be paid
from the residuary estate. The will also provided for an
annuity for the decedent’s mother, to be paid from the
residuary estate.  Finally, the will provided that the
residuary estate pass to the surviving spouse in trust.  The
IRS ruled that the marital deduction for the marital trust was
to exclude the taxes paid from the residuary estate and the
value of the property needed to produce the annuity for the
decedent’s mother, valued under Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7 as
of the date of the decedent’s death. Ltr. Rul. 9313002, May
15, 1992.
The IRS had reduced the estate’s marital deduction by
the amount of estate administrative expenses which were
paid out of the estate’s net income during the
administration. The court held that the marital deduction
would be reduced whether the administrative expenses were
paid from estate corpus or income. Fisher v. U.S., 93-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60, 132 (Fed. Cl. 1993).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the pending
publication of new Form 706 and 706-NA for use by estates
of decedents dying after December 31, 1992. The new
forms use the new tax rate of 50 percent but the IRS
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cautions that the rate may be increased by Congress to the
old rate of 55 percent. Ann. 93-61, I.R.B. 1993-16.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION-ALM § 5.03[2].  The
IRS has issued the list of average annual effective interest
rates charged on new loans by the Farm Credit Bank system
to be used in computing the value of real property for
special use valuation purposes:
   District    Interest rate  
Baltimore 9.75
Columbia 10.35
Louisville 10.16
Omaha 9.54
Sacramento 11.03
St. Paul 10.28
Spokane 10.27
Springfield 10.10
Texas 10.05
Wichita 9.75
 Rev. Rul. 93-28, I.R.B. 1991-15, 7. Note that the St. Louis
District has merged with the St. Paul District.
The decedent bequeathed equal undivided interests in
special use valuation property to six children. The children
exchanged the undivided interests for equal portions of the
property.  Five of the children cash leased their properties to
the sixth child. The court held that the cash lease caused
recapture of the five children’s share of the special use
valuation benefits. Fisher v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-
139.
     VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6]. The taxpayer transferred
a one-half community property interest in a residence to a
20-year trust with the taxpayer as beneficiary and the
taxpayer’s children as remainder holders, subject to
defeasance by a power of appointment held by the trustee
who could be a related party.  The IRS ruled that (1) the
trust qualified as personal residence trust not subject to
valuation under I.R.C. § 2702 and (2) the transfer to the
trust was a completed gift to the remainder holders. Ltr.
Rul. 9315019, Jan. 13, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BAD DEBT DEDUCTION-ALM § 4.03[7]. The
taxpayer had to make $5,000 in payment to support the
taxpayer’s children because the former spouse failed to
make child support payments. The IRS ruled that because
the child support obligation was imposed by the divorce
decree, the taxpayer had no basis in the child support
obligation of the former spouse; therefore, no bad debt
deduction would be allowed for the taxpayer’s own
payment of the obligation. Rev. Rul. 93-27, I.R.B. 1993-
15, 4.
CASUALTY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[2][a]. The
taxpayer was not allowed a casualty loss deduction for the
decline in value of stock during the market crash of 1987
because the loss did not result from a closed transaction.
Furer v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-165.
COMMODITY STRADDLES. Gains realized on
commodity futures straddles entered into on the London
Metal Exchange by commodities traders were long-term
gains. Johnson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-178.
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.  In 1990, the
cooperative had a member-sourced net operating loss in one
of its regional operations. In 1991, the same regional
operation had net earnings from member patronage sources.
The cooperative wanted to make an allocation of patronage
dividends to members in that regional operation before
utilizing the net operating loss from 1990. The IRS ruled
that because the membership in the regional operation was
relatively steady and the allocation of the loss was
consistent with the membership agreement, the allocations
would be allowed as proposed. Ltr. Rul. 9314013, Jan. 6,
1993.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03. The taxpayer had been
using the Accelerated Cost Recovery Method of claiming
depreciation on an apartment building acquired before
1981. The taxpayer attempted to revoke the ACRS method
and change to the straight line method on a tax return. The
court held that prior consent from the IRS was required to
change the depreciation method on property acquired before
1981. Henderson v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-171.
HOBBY LOSSES-ALM § 4.05[1]. The taxpayers were
denied deduction of losses from a horse breeding business
because the activity was not engaged in for profit where the
taxpayers’ estimates of expected profits were unreasonable
and inaccurate; the losses continued to be significant; and
the taxpayers had substantial income from their
employment as accounting professors. Smith v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-140.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The IRS filed a
final partnership administrative adjustment (FPAA) with the
largest general partner, the managing partner, all partners
and the partnership. The managing partner was not the
designated tax matters partner (TMP) but the managing
partner filed a petition contesting the FPAA and signed the
petition as TMP.  Two years later, the other partners
claimed that (1) the petition was invalid because not made
by the TMP and (2) because no valid petition had been
filed, the statute of limitations had expired on the FPAA.
The court held that the other partners had ratified the
managing partner’s actions by failing to object earlier and
waiting until the statute of limitations had passed.
Mishawaka Properties Co. v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. No. 22
(1993).
DEFINITION. The IRS has ruled that a company
formed under the Nevada Limited Liability Companies Act,
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 86.011 et seq., was classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes. Rev. Rul. 93-30,
I.R.B. 1993-16, 4.
RETIREMENT PLANS. The IRS has provided
additional guidance concerning the time period for
providing the written explanation required under I.R.C. §
402(f) and the time period for satisfying the consent
requirements of I.R.C. § 411(a)(11). Participants are
allowed to waive the 30-day period for consent and to
waive the written explanation requirement. Notice 93-26,
I.R.B. 1993-18.
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The IRS has issued proposed regulations, under I.R.C. §
401(l), which provide for a permitted disparity between
employer contributions to and employer-provided benefits
under qualified plans. 58 Fed. Reg. 21426 (April 21, 1993).
The IRS has issued proposed regulations amending the
rules under I.R.C. § 410(b) as to the minimum coverage
requirements and nondiscrimination requirements of I.R.C.
§ 401(a)(4). 58 Fed. Reg. 21412, 21417 (April 21, 1993).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that taxpayers may
file for an automatic four month extension for filing a return
and are not required to make full payment with the
extension request. The tax liability must be fully estimated
on the extension request and the full payment with interest
made by the end of the extension. No penalty will be
assessed for late payment if the extension procedures are
correctly followed. Notice 93-22, I.R.B. 1993-17.
The IRS has issued proposed regulations which allow
persons who file fiduciary income tax returns for
compensation to use a facsimile signature instead of a
manual signature. 58 Fed. Reg. 21548 (April 22, 1993).
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
May 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.72 3.69 3.67 3.66
110% AFR 4.10 4.06 4.04 4.03
120% AFR 4.48 4.43 4.41 4.39
Mid-term
AFR 5.46 5.39 5.35 5.33
110% AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86
120% AFR 6.57 6.47 6.42 6.38
Long-term
AFR 6.53 6.43 6.38 6.35
110% AFR 7.19 7.07 7.01 6.97
120% AFR 7.87 7.72 7.65 7.60
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].
ELECTION. In 1983, a C corporation filed a Form
1120-S as an election to be taxed as an S corporation. The
IRS rejected the return and the corporation refiled a Form
1120 and paid taxes as a C corporation.  In 1984, the
corporation again filed a Form 1120-S, stating on the form
that the previous Form 1120-S was an election to be taxed
as an S corporation. The court held that no valid election
had been made because the corporation failed to timely file
Form 2553 as required by the regulations. Rockwell Inn,
Ldt. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-158.
TRUSTS. A trust owned shares of an S corporation. The
trust provided for payment of net trust income to the
beneficiary and allowed the beneficiary to withdraw up to a
fixed amount of trust corpus annually. At the death of the
beneficiary, the trust terminated and all trust property
passed to a third party. The third party had a durable power
of attorney to act on behalf of the beneficiary. The IRS
ruled that the trust was a QSST. Ltr. Rul. 9314021, Jan. 7,
1993.
A trust holding S corporation stock had two equal
beneficiaries such that each beneficiary’s share could be
considered a separate trust. However, the trust provided that
all trust corpus could be distributed to one beneficiary for
the health, education, support or maintenance of the
beneficiary. Because that beneficiary had substantial
income from other sources, the possibility of distribution of
trust corpus to that beneficiary was remote.  The IRS ruled
that because a possibility, however remote, existed that trust
corpus could be distributed to one of the beneficiaries, the
share of the other beneficiary could not be a QSST. Rev.
Rul. 93-31, I.R.B. 1993-17, 5.
TAX LIENS. The IRS has issued proposed regulations
which provide that a state is not considered to have
designated a second office for filing a notice of tax lien
where the state establishes a national filing system under a
nontax federal statute (e.g. the central filing system required
under the federal farm products rule for security interests in
farm products).  58 Fed. Reg. 21550 (April 22, 1993).
WITHHOLDING TAXES .-ALM § 4.06 During the
taxpayer’s employment, the employer did not withhold or
pay federal employment taxes for the taxpayer; instead, the
taxpayer paid the self-employment tax. The taxpayer sought
a refund of the self-employment taxes, arguing that the
taxpayer was an employee and not liable for self-
employment taxes. The taxpayer and IRS agreed that the
taxpayer was an employee. The court held that the taxpayer
was not entitled to a refund of the amount paid which
should have been withheld and paid by the employer from
the taxpayer’s wages. The court also held that the taxpayer
was not entitled to a refund for the amount of the
employer’s portion of the FICA taxes. Thus, the taxpayer
was entitled only to the amount of self-employment taxes
paid which exceeded the total FICA taxes which would
have been paid by the taxpayer’s employer. Donohoe v.
U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,216 (W.D. Wash.
1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONTINUATION. The debtors had granted a bank a
security interest in farm machinery prior to granting a
security interest in the same machinery to the FmHA. The
bank filed its security interest before the FmHA perfected
its security interest. The bank filed a continuation statement
six months and four days before the security interest was to
expire. The continuation statute required continuation
statements to be filed within the six months before the
expiration of a security agreement. During the bankruptcy
proceeding of the debtor, the FmHA believed that it had a
junior security interest in the machinery and filed no
objections to the debtor’s plan. However, after the debtor
defaulted on the plan payments and the bank sought to sell
the machinery and collect the proceeds, the FmHA asserted
a priority security interest based on the bank’s faulty
continuation filing. The court held that the six month
continuation filing requirement was absolute, making the
bank’s security interest unperfected.  The court also held
that other equitable defenses did not apply because the
FmHA did not have access to the relevant documents and
had made no misrepresentations as to fact. In re
Isringhausen, 151 B.R. 203 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1993).
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JOURNAL ARTICLES
A. Pires, “Why the U.S. Claims Court [now the
Court of Federal Claims] is not a Viable Venue for
Farmers: The U.S. Claims Court’s Handling of
Agricultural Cases, 1980-1990,” Univ. of Ark. L. J. 223
(Winter 1993). The article does a fine job of supporting the
thesis that appeals of adverse decisions by the USDA have
more opportunities for relief in the U.S. District Court than
in the Federal Court of Claims. However, perhaps the better
lesson is the need for appellants to carefully present their
case before the lower administrative agencies to build a
record on which either reviewing court can support relief
for the appellant. As the article points out, local and state
USDA agencies may not allow appellants much opportunity
to present evidence, but the recent case of Jones v. Espy,
Civ. Action No. 90-2831-LFO (D. D.C. 1993) see p. 64
supra may help convince the USDA agencies that failure to
allow complete presentations of evidence will not be
tolerated by the courts, at least the U.S. District Court.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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